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by Carl E. Schneider 
n June 1997 a sixteen-year-old girl 
named Shannon Nixon began to I feel ill. Her parents belonged to 
the Faith Tabernacle Church, one of a 
number of American sects which believe 
that illness should be treated spiritually 
rather than medically. Accordingly, the 
Nkons prayed for Shannon and took 
her to be anointed at their church. 
Shannon reported that she felt better 
and that the spiritual treatment had 
gained her her victory-her recovery. 
Before long, however, Shannon again 
felt ill. She became weaker and weaker 
and then fell into a coma. A few hours 
later she died. An autopsy revealed that 
she had succumbed to diabetic acidosis. 
Shannon’s parents were charged with 
involuntary manslaughter and endan- 
gering the welhe  of a child. A jury 
found them gurlty, and the judge sen- 
tenced them to prison for two and half 
to five years and fined them $1,000.1 
The Nixons’ case merits attention 
not because it sets an astonishing new 
precedent, but because in its ordinari- 
ness it represents several continuing de- 
velopments in a problem with which 
the law has had a prolonged and per- 
turbed history. It is standard doctrine 
that parents have a duty to provide their 
children the medical care they need. 
Parents who breach this duty may ordi- 
narily be judged to have “abused or ne- 
glected” their child, they may be subject 
to criminal penalties, and the state may 
step in to protect the child, even to the 
extent of terminating the parents’ legal 
relationship with the child. States have 
long intervened to secure medical care 
for children who are seriously ill but 
whose parents refuse to provide them 
medical care, even if the parents are 
motivated by their religious beliefs. 
The first amendment to the Consti- 
tution, of course, protects the “free exer- 
cise” of religion. Doesn’t this mean that 
parents who deny their children med- 
ical care for religious reasons can pre- 
vent the state from overriding their de- 
cision to be more concerned for their 
children’s immortal souls than for their 
children’s temporal bodies? The conven- 
tional answer to that question is no, not 
least because of the Supreme Court‘s 
decision in Prince II. Massachweta.2 In 
an often-quoted passage, it said, “Par- 
ents may be free to become martyrs 
themselves. But it does not follow they 
are free, in identical circumstances, to 
make martyrs of their children before 
they have reached the age of full and 
legal discretion when they can make 
that choice for themselves.” 
Suppose, however, that-as easily 
happenethe state does not find out 
that a child is being denied treatment 
until the child has died. The usual rule 
here is that i f a  child dies because the 
parents have withheld medical care, the 
parents may be held criminally liable for 
the death. 
Nevertheless, where parents have re- 
fused medical treatment for their chil- 
dren for religions reasons, the Fncerns 
that animate the first amendm&t might 
lead us not to invoke the criminal law 
against them. \Furthermore, prosecu- 
tions of these parents is notoriously dif- 
ficult. The parents’ failure to provide 
medical care must be identified as the 
cause of death, a prosecutor must de- 
cide to prosecute, a jury must decide to 
convict, a judge must decide to sen- 
tence, and an appellate court must de- 
cline to use any of the numerous devices 
at its disposal to reverse the conviction. 
It is thus not so surprising that for many 
years there were no reported appellate 
court opinions upholding homicide 
convictions of parents whose children 
had died because they had been given 
spiritual rather than medical care (al- 
though some parents were convicted of 
charges less than homicide). 
In recent years, however, this tacit 
compromise has been disturbed by two 
conflicting developments. On one hand, 
most states have adopted statutes that 
exempt religiously motivated parents 
from some of the effects of child protec- 
tion laws. On the other hand, the num- 
ber of homicide prosecutions of parents 
whose children have died after their par- 
ents treated them spiritually appears to 
have increased, and opinions upholding 
homicide convictions in these situations 
have begun to appear. 
Nixon illustrates why these two 
trends seem to conflict and why the 
new statutory exemptions raise prob- 
lems for homicide prosecutions. To un- 
derstand the case, we need to look care- 
fully at the Pennsylvania exemption at 
issue. The commonwealth’s Child Pro- 
tective Services Act (the CPSA) pro- 
vides that if a county child protection 
agency 
determines that a child has not 
been provided needed medical or 
surgical care because of seriously 
held religious beliefs of the child’s 
parents, . . . which beliefs are con- 
sistent with those of a bona fide 
religion, the child shall not be 
deemed to be physically or mend- 
ly abused. The county agency shall 
closely monitor the chid and shall 
seek court-ordered medid inter- 
vention when the lack of medical 
or surgical care threatens the child’s 
life or long-term health. In cases 
involving religious circumstances, 
all correspondence with a subject 
of the report and the records of the 
Department of Public Welfare and 
the county agency shall not refer- 
ence “child abuse” and shall ac- 
knowledge the religious basis for 
the child‘s condition, and the fam- 
ily shall be referred to general pro- 
tective services, if appropriate.3 
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The Nixons argued that their due 
process rights had been violated because 
this statute created such doubt about 
parents’ duty to provide medical care 
that the Nixons did not have enough 
notice that treating Shannon spiritually 
might subject them to liability under 
the state’s manslaughter statute. The 
Nixons had a point. If a child denied 
medical care for religious reasons was 
not to be “deemed to be physically or 
mentally abused,” might the Nixons 
not reasonably conclude that they had 
no duty to provide medical care? And if 
they had no duty to provide medical 
care, how could a failure to provide it 
make them liable for manslaughter? At 
least two state supreme courts have 
found that the particular language of 
their state’s exemption did make homi- 
cide convictions improper. 
Nevertheless, the N b n  court, like 
courts in at least two other states, con- 
cluded that the exemption did not cre- 
ate a notice problem. The court’s opin- 
ion is neither thorough nor lucid, but 
it may be read as arguing along these 
lines: The CPSA and the mansla@ter 
statute do not conflict. Parents have a 
duty “to procure medical treatment of 
their children.” If their children die be- 
cause they have breached that duty, they 
may be guilty of involuntary man- 
slaughter. Noth~ng in the CPSA changes 
that. 
Pennsylvania law, the court ob- 
served, provides that a person “is guilty 
of involuntary m a n s h g h p  when as a 
directresultof ... t h e d o k u  wful 
act in a reckless or grossly neglig \nt 
manner, he causes the death of another / 
person.” The court reasoned that 
an act which does not quaIi6 as 
child abuse may sti l l  be done in a 
manner which causes death and 
slaughter. . . . While the Nixons 
were not consided child abuseis‘ ---- 
for treating their children through 
spiritual healing, when their other- 
wise lawful course of conduct led to 
a child’s death, they were gullty of 
involuntary manslaughter. 
thus qualifies as involuntary man- 
had said that spiritual healing was “an 
accepted treatment for illness in chil- 
dren, raising it to the same level as con- 
ventional medical treatment.” But, the 
court said, the CPSA “merely exempts 
parents who treat their children in this 
manner from characterization as child 
abusers.” Finally, the court was fortified 
in its conclusion by the hct that the 
CPSA clearly contemplated that the 
state should intervene to secure medical 
care for seriously ill children whose par- 
ents opposed medical treatment for reli- 
gious reasons. In effect, the court said 
that when the legislature enacted the 
exemption it did not intend to alter its 
manslaughter statute and that that 
should have been evident to the Nixons. 
And while it is hard to know just what 
regulatory regime the court envisaged, it 
may have contemplated a new kind of 
compromise in which parents may treat 
their ill children spiritually without fear 
of criminal liability, but only insofir as 
such treatment does not pose extreme 
risks to the child‘s life or health. 
The court’s legal analysis seems plau- 
sible but not inevitable. Certainly the 
court was not grasping at ways of re- 
versing the parents’ manslaughter con- 
victions, suggesting that this court was 
less impressed than its competitors with 
the argument against such prosecutions. 
That argument contends that while re- 
quiring medical care for ill children may 
be desirable, prosecuting parents who 
have given their children spiritual treat- 
ment is not. After the child has died, it 
is too late to prevent the parents from 
“mak[ind martyrs of their children.” 
Furthermore, the usual justifications for 
punishment-retribution, general de- 
terrence, and specific deterren-may 
seem to fit these situations poorly. 
Retribution fix parents whose deep- 
est religious convictions lead them to 
care for their children in their own way 
and who are already suffer ing from the 
+th of their child seem neither ap- 
propxate nor nemsary. General deter- 
rence is notoriously ineffective where 
parents believe they must obey a higher 
authority than secular law. As to specif- 
ic deterrence, if a Darent is undeterred 
Two features of Nixon may have 
helped reinforce the court’s view of 
these prosecutions. First, Shannon’s ill- 
ness was not one for which treatment 
was controversial or highly uncertain. 
This is typical. The most recent survey 
of these cases suggests that “death 
and/or suffering were preventable in vir- 
tually all of these children. These htali- 
ties were not from esoteric entities but 
ordinary ailments seen and treated rou- 
tinely in community medical centers.”4 
This leads us to the second aspect of 
Nkon that may have sustained the court 
in its narrow reading of the exemption. 
The Nixons had claimed that their sen- 
tence exceeded the sentencing guide- 
lines. The appellate court upheld the 
sentence because in 1991 the Nixon’s 
nine-year-old son had died “from com- 
plications arising from an ear infeaion.” 
The Nixons had been charged with in- 
voluntary manslaughter and endanger- 
ing the welfare of a child. They pled no 
contest and received two years’ proba- 
tion. The appellate court held that the 
Nixons’ sentence in Shannon’s case was 
“well-justified” by “the possibility of a 
recurrence of these crimina events” (and 
the court might well have thought this 
earlier conviction vitiated the Nixons’ 
notice argument). 
The N b n  case may not be over. Re- 
cent press accounts suggest that the 
Nixons may ask the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court to review their convic- 
tion. And whatever happens to the 
Nixons, the Pennsylvania legislature has 
considerable latitude to d r a w  the line 
between the state’s duty to protect the 
vulnerable and its duty to preserve reli- 
gious liberty. 
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The court intimated that the case 
might have been different if the CPSA 
by the death bf a &Id, why should the 
risk of prosecution make any difference? 
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